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MCCULLOCH’S “PERPETUALLY ARISING” 
QUESTIONS 
David S. Schwartz* 
I’m truly honored to have my book be the subject of a sym-
posium on Balkinization, and I’m deeply grateful to Jack Balkin 
and John Mikhail for organizing and hosting it.  Among its many 
gratifications for me personally, the symposium guaranteed that 
at least eight people would read the book.  That these readers have 
engaged with it so closely and insightfully is icing on the cake. 
My first article on McCulloch four years ago, which became 
the basis for a couple of the early chapters in the book, insisted 
that McCulloch was properly interpreted as far less nationalistic 
than we were taught to think.1  But Sandy Levinson persuaded me 
that I was mistaken in asserting that there was one true interpre-
tation of the case.  The more I thought about it, the more my in-
terpretation of McCulloch, like the arc of federalism history, 
would bend toward nationalism.  The case is highly—probably 
studiedly—ambiguous, and the logic of its theory of implied pow-
ers is so decidedly nationalistic that the “aggressive nationalism” 
interpretation I take issue with is not exactly wrong.  By the time 
I completed the book, I had come around to the view that Marshall 
tried to mask, and later actually retreated from, the nationalistic 
logic of his own McCulloch opinion, and that the Supreme Court 
has never consistently embraced that logic.  
But if a book winds up as a mental map of the author’s evolv-
ing thinking, it will be confusing and will invite conflicting inter-
pretation.  I was therefore delighted that the symposium posts 
read the book the way I ultimately hoped it to be understood.  The 
posts by Richard Primus and Victoria Nourse are the sort of book 
reviews an author daydreams about: expressing what I tried to 
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1. David S. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch v. Maryland, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1,
23 (2015). 
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convey in language better than I was able to write, while extend-
ing the book’s implications into ideas of their own.  Primus is too 
modest to say that he is one of the two leading figures (John Mi-
khail is the other) in the “new wave of literature arguing for . . . 
skepticism toward the orthodox account of Congress as a legisla-
ture limited by enumerated powers.”2  If my book contributes to 
that literature, then my work here is done.  Nourse sees my book 
as supporting her view of federalism as “a story of judicial hu-
bris.”  As she crisply puts it, “No federalism standard created by 
courts can destroy the states.”3  But the Court has frequently as-
sumed otherwise, and it is this view, I argue, that has led it to 
ignore McCulloch’s full implications for most of the past 200 
years. 
Franita Tolson and Mark Graber use my brief treatment of 
McCulloch and the Reconstruction Amendments as a springboard 
for a stimulating discussion of the enforcement clauses.  Graber 
argues that the rights/structure distinction in constitutional law 
teaching and doctrine denigrates the legislative role in creating 
and enforcing rights.  That’s an extremely important insight that 
delegitimates cases like City of Boerne v. Flores4 and Shelby 
County v. Holder,5 as well as the Court’s failure to overrule The 
Civil Rights Cases6 when upholding the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  
Tolson argues here, as in her excellent scholarship,7 for a broad 
construction of Congress’s enforcement powers under these 
amendments.  According to Tolson, the phrase “appropriate leg-
islation” in the enforcement clauses of all three Reconstruction 
Amendments signals a design to read these clauses synergistically 
with the other enumerated powers of Congress.  I couldn’t agree 
more that Congress’s enforcement powers under these 
2. Richard Primus, Marshaling McCulloch, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 11, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/PK9R-WBNA].  See, e.g., John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper 
Clauses, 102 GEO. L. J. 1045 (2014); Richard Primus, “The Essential Characteristic”: Enu-
merated Powers and the Bank of the United States, 117 MICH. L. REV. 415 (2018).  
3. Victoria Nourse, McCulloch v. Maryland: Not Only Right, But Inevitable,
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 18, 2019) 
4. 521 U.S. 507, 527-29 (1997).
5. 570 U.S. 529, 555 (2013).
6. 109 U.S. 3, 14-15, 25 (1883).
7. See e.g., Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement,
89 WASH. L. REV. 379, 384-86 (2014). 
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amendments should be read broadly, and Tolson and I undoubt-
edly agree that the Court undermined the spirit of these power 
grants in The Civil Rights Cases and Shelby County.  
John Mikhail and Kurt Lash, in very different ways, enrich 
our understanding of McCulloch’s context.  I will reply to Lash 
in a separate post.  Mikhail shows that McCulloch, rather than 
representing the alpha and omega of congressional powers, is but 
a piece in the larger puzzle of the Constitution’s enumeration of 
powers. 8  That puzzle is whether the Constitution limited the na-
tional government to its enumerated powers.  Mikhail, as I noted 
above, is the leading figure along with Richard Primus in an 
emerging body of scholarship suggesting that the Constitution’s 
grant of powers was not so limited.  Mikhail’s current post, along 
with his recent Balkinization symposium contribution on Jona-
than Gienapp’s splendid The Second Creation,9 are essential read-
ing on this vital question.  As Mikhail demonstrates, this question 
cannot be answered by cherry-picking quotations from The Fed-
eralist or the ratification debates, but requires disentangling the 
positions taken in the series of debates from the Philadelphia Con-
vention through the First Congress, with careful attention to the 
constitutional position of slavery.  Mikhail’s dueling “slavery syl-
logisms,” by which he explains the pro-slavery motivation behind 
a limited-enumerated-power interpretation of the Constitution, 
are a brilliant addition to scholarship on federal powers. 
Anything written about McCulloch since 2006 owes a huge 
debt to Mark Killenbeck’s and Sandy Levinson’s scholarship on 
the case.10  Along with that of Gerard Magliocca and Jack Bal-
kin,11 their work asks whether we really understand McCulloch as 
8. John Mikhail, McCulloch, Slavery, and the Sweeping Clause, BALKINIZATION
(Nov. 25, 2019) 
9. John Mikhail, Fixing the Constitution’s Implied Powers, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 25,
2018), [ https://perma.cc/9WS2-FD6V]; JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: 
FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 68 (2018). 
10. See, e.g., MARK R. KILLENBECK, M’CULLOCH V. MARYLAND: SECURING A NATION 
90 (2006); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. 
L. REV. 963, 1008 (1998); Sanford Levinson, The Confusing Language of McCulloch v.
Maryland: Did Marshall Really Know What He Was Doing (or Meant)?, 72 ARK. L. REV. 7,
9 (2019).
11. Gerard N. Magliocca, A New Approach to Congressional Power: Revisiting the
Legal Tender Cases, 95 GEO. L.J. 119, 125 (2006); Balkin & Levinson, supra note 10; Jack 
M. Balkin, The Use That the Future Makes of the Past: John Marshall’s Greatness and Its
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well as we think we do, and why and how it holds a place within 
the “canon” of constitutional law.  In his post, Killenbeck argues 
that McCulloch presents “a far more Marshallian conception of 
federal power” than is recognized in revisionist accounts, partic-
ularly when we consider Marshall’s felt need to navigate the hos-
tile Jeffersonian-Republican political environment in which he 
wrote.  I agree with Killenbeck that Marshall obscured McCulloch 
in a (perhaps vain) effort to preempt attacks on the Court by strict 
constructionists while offering a theory of implied powers  that 
was indeed “robust.”  But Marshall himself backed away from the 
robust implications of implied powers almost immediately after 
the opinion was issued—starting with his April and June 1819 
editorials defending McCulloch12 and more consequentially in 
Gibbons v. Ogden (1824).13  Thus, to my mind, Marshall’s failure 
to cite McCulloch in later cases, which Killenbeck attributes to 
Marshall’s judicial writing style, was more substantive in its im-
plications.  For reasons I explain in Chapter 4, Marshall refrained 
from applying the broad implied powers concept to the Com-
merce Clause, where it might have done significant work in ad-
vancing nationalist jurisprudence.  In part for that reason, and in 
contrast to the conventional view, I argue that the appellation “na-
tion builder” applies far more accurately to Marshall’s National 
Republican contemporaries Henry Clay and John Quincy Adams 
than it does to Marshall.  Clay and Adams, unlike Marshall, actu-
ally argued that the Constitution blessed the building of national 
infrastructure.14 
Sandy Levinson has read and parsed the McCulloch opinion 
more than anyone: even in conversation, he can quote passages, 
chapter and verse, and can cite them by paragraph number.  In his 
symposium contribution, Levinson continues to raise probing 
questions about Marshall’s argumentative technique and concep-
tual difficulties in McCulloch.  For example, what did Marshall 
Lessons for Today’s Supreme Court Justices, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1321, 1336-37 
(2002). 
12. See JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 78, 155 (Gerald
Gunther, ed. 1969). 
13. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 33 (1824).
14. DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN MARSHALL AND 
THE 200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND  46-47, 59-80 (2019). 
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mean when calling Maryland a “sovereign” state in the opinion’s 
first line?  Levinson also shows us that there is much more to be 
learned from the frequently underemphasized second section of 
the opinion, dealing with the taxation question, which Levinson 
dubs “McCulloch II.” Levinson’s longstanding love affair with 
McCulloch was a source of inspiration to my research, but his 
post, and more recent writing—including his Salmon P. Chase 
Lecture—look like a series of “Dear John [Marshall]” break-up 
letters.15  He continues to call Marshall’s opinion the work of “a 
rhetorical genius,” but questions the quality of Marshall’s reason-
ing, particularly on such key concepts as “sovereignty” and the 
concurrent power of taxation.  Levinson goes so far as to suggest 
that Holmes’s “famously snarky address” on John Marshall Day 
in 190116 may offer more truth than the conventionally idolatrous 
portraits of Marshall.  
Levinson’s post demonstrates that McCulloch is a deep, if 
not bottomless, well of ambiguity such that new interpretations of 
it, to borrow Marshall’s phrase, “will probably continue to arise, 
as long as our system shall exist.”  Levinson is therefore quite 
right that my book cannot be a “definitive” account of McCulloch; 
I can only hope that it is a useful contribution to an ongoing dia-
logue.  
15. Levinson, supra note 10, at 28-30; Sanford Levinson, Salmon P. Chase Distin-
guished Lecture at the Georgetown Center for the Constitution, 2019 Salmon P. Chase Lec-
ture and Colloquium: The 200th Anniversary of McCulloch v. Maryland (Dec. 5, 2019).  
16. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, John Marshall, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 266
(1920). 
